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Abstract 
In this paper, I will argue that the round table model is the ideal constitution making process. 
This is primarily because it gives clarity to the respective powers of the institutions involved 
in the process, and may prevent a dominant group or individual from unilaterally imposing a 
constitution. In building my argument, I outline the theory of constituent power and its 
corollaries of unlimited constitution making power and popular participation. I endeavour to 
portray the shortcomings of the theory itself, and, the dangers of its practical manifestation. 
Following this, I introduce the round table model as a preferable alternative, both 
theoretically and practically. To buttress my argument, I examine the Bolivian, Venezuelan, 
Russian and South African constitution making episodes. 
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I Introduction  
In this paper I will argue that the round table model, or “post sovereign constitution-
making”,
1
 as Andrew Arato calls it, is the ideal constitution making process. The model can 
be summarised briefly as follows. There is a two stage process where two constitutions are 
made. The first constitution is an ‘interim constitution,’ that binds the makers of the second 
constitution, which is the ‘final constitution’. The interim constitution can include both 
substantive limits and procedural rules, and is negotiated by a pluralistic group representing 
different interests in society. For example, in South Africa, this group consisted of the then 
current government and the opposition parties. A constitutional court will be established (if 
one does not already exist), which will police the final constitution maker to ensure 
compliance with the limits and rules laid down in the interim constitution. The body which 
negotiates the interim constitution is unelected, but a democratically elected assembly drafts 
the second and final constitution.
2
 
I accord pre-eminence to the round table model primarily because an interim 
constitution negotiated by a broadly representative body gives clarity to the respective powers 
of the actors and institutions involved in the process, and may prevent a dominant group or 
individual from unilaterally imposing a constitution. The importance of an interim 
constitution is borne out by the lack thereof in the Venezuelan, Russian, and Bolivian 
processes, discussed in Part V. In the Venezuelan and Russian episodes, a lack of 
preconceived rules meant that dominant individuals were able to create the rules ‘as they 
went,’ in order to secure their control over the process, and to implement their agendas 
unimpeded. In the Bolivian example, a lack of ground rules led to a chaotic process, where 
the powers of the respective actors were not clear at the outset.  
 In my view, the round table model may resolve these problems. It can do this in two 
ways. Firstly, the constitution making body is limited by the interim constitution because 
there is a constitutional court to certify that the final constitution conforms to the interim 
constitution. The placing of limits on the constitution making body may prevent dominant 
individuals from creating a self-serving constitution. Secondly, a representative body 
negotiating an interim constitution may prevent the implementation of rules for the process 
that favour one group, and will take away the opportunity for a dominant individual, or 
group, to unilaterally create rules to their advantage. For example, in the Venezuelan case, a 
representative body may not have agreed to a non-proportional voting system for the election 
of the Assembly as this would mean that they were handing full power to Hugo Chávez. 
Neither would they have been likely to agree to the dissolution of Congress and the 
assumption of legislative powers by the Assembly, because this further served to concentrate 
                                                            
1 Andrew Arato, “Redeeming the Still Redeemable: Post Sovereign Constitution Making” (2009) 22 Int J Polit 
Cult Soc 427, at 429.  
2
 Andrew Arato, “Conventions, Constituent Assemblies, and Round Tables: Models, Principles and Elements of 
Democratic Constitution-Making” (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism 173; Andrew Arato, above n 1, at 430-
432. 
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power with Chávez and his coalition partners. If a proportional system was used for the 
election of the Assembly, then it would have been very difficult for Chávez to unilaterally 
impose a constitution. While in the Russian example, a round table may not have agreed to 
the President appointing, rather than electing, the Constituent Assembly, and might have 
preferred an election using a proportional system. Admittedly, the above-explained argument 
is premised on the assumption that a round table body will want the constitution making body 
to be broadly representative and not be dominated by one group or individual, and, to this 
end, that they would prefer a proportional voting system over a non-proportional one.  
I use the Bolivian example to claim that, amongst other things, constitution making in 
the midst of a ‘constitutional moment’ where there is increased support for constitutional 
change from the people is undesirable. This is especially so if there is violence or the 
potential for violence.  Instead, a groundswell of support should trigger the round table phase, 
because if violence is inevitable, then it may be less disruptive to the actual constitution 
making if it occurs during the interim constitution making phase, rather than during the 
drafting of the final constitution. If there is a passionate and polarized public who mobilise on 
mass this may have an inhibitory effect on the assembly, as they might feel they are limited in 
their options because they do not want to inflame the public. This could mean that they may 
feel pressured to either reject a proposal that may cause a violent reaction, or support a 
popular proposal for fear of a violent reaction if it is not implemented.  
I refer to the Venezuelan and Russian examples to claim that there is another danger 
in making a constitution while there is a constitutional moment occurring. A popular and 
charismatic leader may be able to more easily appeal to the constituent power theory and 
assert complete control over the constitution making process. I argue that this is another 
reason to implement the round table model, to prevent one party, or individual, from taking 
complete control on the back of popular momentum for constitutional change, because a 
representative body negotiating an interim constitution would be unlikely to agree to rules 
that allow one group to control the process.  
While the round table model lacks some democratic legitimacy in that the interim 
constitution is negotiated by an unelected body, it still has legitimacy in the sense that the 
actors involved accept it as a legitimate method of constitution making.
3
  
In arguing for a round table phase as the most important element in the constitution 
making process, I place less importance on popular participation, because I do not see ‘the 
people’ as having as much influence on the constitutional text as the formalised body of elites 
who actually write the constitution. For example, even in the South African process, which is 
heralded as a paradigmatic example of popular participation,
4
 it is not clear how much 
influence public submissions had on the text of the constitution that emerged out of the 
process.
5
 The round table phase will have more of an influence on the composition of the 
                                                            
3
 Andrew Arato, above n 1, at 434. 
4
 Dann, Philipp et al, Lessons Learned from Constitution-Making: Processes with Broad Based Public 
Participation (Democracy Reporting International, Briefing Paper No.20, November 2011), at 6. 
5 Joel I. Colón-Ríos, “Notes on Democracy and Constitution-Making” (2013) 3 VUWLRP 21, at 31. 
6 
 
body of elites who write the constitution and on the rules that they work within, and hence 
will have more influence on the constitution. However, despite the lesser influence popular of 
participation, it is still an important ingredient in the constitution making process and I do not 
advocate a process devoid of popular participation. In my view, a blue print for a programme 
of organised popular participation has been set by the South African process, which I will 
discuss in Part V. 
In Part II I will outline some of the academic arguments in favour of popular 
participation. Joel Colón-Ríos advocates popular participation in all phases of the constitution 
making process, whereas within the round table model there is no popular participation in the 
interim constitution making phase. Also, a central plank of his argument is that the 
constitution maker should be unlimited in its constitution making power, whereas under the 
round table model the maker of the final constitution is limited by the interim constitution.  
Because the round table model involves limiting the constitution maker, it is 
necessary to address the theory of constituent power, originally championed by Emanuel 
Sieyès, and then later by Carl Schmitt, who claimed that the institution of the constitution 
maker must be unlimited in its constitution making power. Here I also discuss the constituent 
assembly, which is the practical manifestation of the constituent power theory. Many 
academics view the constituent assembly, imbued with unlimited constitution making power, 
as the ideal formalised constitution making body.
6
 I will argue that a broadly representative 
constituent assembly which is elected using a proportional system is the most appropriate 
constitution making body, but that by virtue of implementing the round table model, it will 
not have unlimited power, as it will be constrained by the interim constitution. 
Following this, I discuss the implications of the round table model for the theory of 
constituent power. Then I proceed to review some of the critiques of the constituent power 
theory, and the dangers of the practical expression of the theory through an unlimited 
constitution making body. In particular, I outline Lars Vinx’s argument that the theory is 
incoherent. I will build on Vinx’s argument to justify the limitations placed on the 
constitution maker under the round table model. I then briefly summarise David Landau’s 
concerns about popular participation and constituent power, and in Part V, with reference to 
the case studies, I argue that these concerns may be allayed through the round table model. 
After critiquing constituent power, I present the round table model, as explained by Andrew 
Arato, and offer it as a form of constitution making that is preferable to an unlimited 
constituent assembly. 
In Part V, I present the Bolivian, Venezuelan, Russian, and South African case studies 
in an effort to show the practical advantages of the round table model. This section concludes 
with my analysis of the case studies in relation to the round table model. I argue that the use 
of a round table phase where government and opposition parties negotiate an interim 
                                                            
6
 Joel I. Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 27; Jon Elster “Ways of Constitution-Making” In Axel Hadenus (ed) 
Democracy’s Victory and Crisis (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), at 137; Jon Elster, 
“Legislatures as Constituent Assemblies” In Richard Brauman and Tsvi Kahana (ed) The Least Examined 
Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006). 
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constitution which lays out the rules for the constitution making process and the principles 
that it will be bound by should be present in every constitution making episode. 
II Constituent Power: Popular Participation and Constituent Assemblies 
Until fairly recently, there was generally mistrust in the ability of ‘the people’ to grasp 
constitutional issues, and to understand the dynamics of state power.
7
 For this reason, direct 
participation of the people in constitution making (or ordinary law making) was not 
promoted, and representative democracy was the norm.
8
 That is, the people democratically 
elect representatives to govern on their behalf.  
However, the tide of opinion has changed. It is now common and expected practise to 
include popular participation in the constitution making process. It is seen as an essential 
element in the democratic legitimacy of the constitution.
9
 Furthermore, popular participation 
is emerging as (or already is according to some) an international norm.
10
 However, the 
preponderance of popular participation is not simply due to pragmatic evolution, it is 
ideologically driven by the constituent power theory. 
Since the late 1980s there has been an increasing academic interest in the relationship 
between democracy and constitutionalism. There has been a lot of attention focussed on how 
to increase the ‘democratic legitimacy’ of the process of constitution-making.
11
 Under this 
process based approach, the legitimacy of a constitution is determined by its authorship, and 
in this respect popular participation ensures that the “revolutionary will of the people” is 
connected to the making of the constitution.
12
 
Although this theory has been solidified and clearly articulated in more recent times, 
it has classical roots. John Locke, writing in the seventeenth century, stated that the 
“constituted commonwealth” is subordinate to the “supream power” possessed by the original 
constituting community to alter or overthrow the existing form of government.
13
 During the 
Philadelphia Convention, when justifying the decision to meet without the authorisation of 
the constituted bodies, James Madison referred to the “transcendent and precious right of the 
people to abolish or alter their government as to them might seem most likely to secure their 
safety and happiness.”
14
  
                                                            
7
 Yash Ghai, The Role of Constituent Assemblies in Constitution-Making (IDEA, 2006), at 4. 
8
 Andreas Kalyvas, “Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power” (2005) 12 Constellations 
223, at 226. 
9
 Zackary Elkins et al, “The Citizen as Founder: Public Participation in Constitutional Approval” (2011) 81 TLR 
101, at 101. 
10
 Thomas Franck and Arun Thiruvengadam, “Norms of International Law Relating to the Constitution-Making 
Process”, in Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution-Making (Laurel E Miller, 
2010), at 14; Michelle Brandt et al, Constitution-Making and Reform: Options for the Process (Interpeace, 
2011), at 81; Vivien Hart, Democratic Constitution-Making (U.S Int. of Peace, 12 2003), at 1. 
11
 William Partlett, “The Dangers of Popular Constitution-Making” (2012) 38 1 Brook. J. Int’L L 194, at 194. 
12 At 197. 
13
John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of 
Civil Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), at 366-367. 
14
 James Madison, “The Federalist No. 40,” The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York, Modern 
Library, 1938), at 257-258. 
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The modern manifestation of these ideas is the author based approach, which ties the 
legitimacy of the constitution to its authorship. Under this conception, the people are viewed 
as the appropriate authors of the constitution. This idea is expressed through Emmanuel 
Joseph Sieyès’ “constituent power” theory. According to Sieyès, the ‘nation’ (the people) 
acted in two ways within a democracy. One way is acting indirectly through elected 
representatives in the legislature in their ordinary law making capacity. The other way occurs 
in exceptional circumstances, where the people exercise their “constituent power,” to 
disestablish the existing order and replace it with a newly constituted government. Under this 
theory, a truly democratic constitution is one that is produced in an episode of mass popular 
participation when the people themselves can claim authorship of the constitution.
15
 For it to 
be said that ‘the people’ as a whole have acted, they must have acted outside the pre-existing 
constitution established under the old regime. For a constitution to have the status of higher 
law its foundation must be able to be separated from ordinary law and politics.
16
 
Carl Schmitt echoes the ideas of Sieyès, and directly refers to Sieyès as the founder of 
the theory that the people are the subject of the constitution making power. Schmitt states that 
“the constitution making power is unified and indivisible…it is the comprehensive founder of 
all other ‘powers’ and ‘separation of powers.”
17
 He then states that there can be no restraints 
whatsoever on the “constitution making power.”
18
 
There have been others too, who have expressed similar beliefs. For example, James 
Wilson, at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, stated that, “As our constitutions are superior 
to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitutions. The consequence is, that 
people may change constitutions whenever and however they please.”
19
 As with Schmitt, 
Wilson expressed the view that the people are sovereign, and there can be no limits on their 
constitution making power, which is the crux of the theory. Maurice Duverger offers a 
contribution along similar lines, stating that, “It is the constitution that derives its authority 
form the constituent power, not the constituent power that derives its authority from the 
constitution.”
20
 
Clearly, there is a lot of historical support for the idea that the people hold the extra-
legal and unrestrained power to make a constitution when they are characterised as the 
“original constituting power.”
21
 There is also contemporary support for this theory too,
22
 
which I will discuss below.  
                                                            
15
 Emanuel Joseph Sieyès, What is the Third Estate? S.E Finer ed. M Blondel trans. (London, Pall Mall Press, 
1963), at 121-122.  
16
 Thomas Paine, Rights of Man: Being an Answer to Mr Burke’s Attack on the French Revolution, in Rights of 
Man, Common Sense and other Political Writings (J.S Jordan, 1791), at 122. 
17
 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2008), at 126. 
18
 At 130. 
19
 McClellan, James and Bradford, M.E eds. Jonathon Elliot’s Debates in the Several State Conventions on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787,. 
(Cumberland VA: J. River, 1989), at 432.  
20
 Maurice Duverger, “Legitimite des Gouvernements de fait” (1948) Revue du Droit Publique, at 78.  
21
 John Locke, above n 13, at 366-367 
22 Joel I. Colón-Ríos, above n 5. 
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Nowadays, there are two practical implications of the constituent power theory in the 
context of constitution making. Firstly, a constitution making episode must involve high 
levels of popular participation, to ensure that the constitution has democratic legitimacy, and 
that the people can claim authorship of it.  Secondly, the people’s constituent power should be 
formally embodied in a constituent assembly which is possessed of unlimited constitution 
making power and is thus superior to, and unrestrained by, the constituted organs of 
government (the executive, legislature, and judiciary).
23
  
Joel Colón-Ríos advocates a high level of popular participation in constitution making 
because it is necessary to make the process democratic.
24
 In the ideal constitution making 
episode the people would “come together, as political equals, and exercise their unlimited 
constitution making power”.
25
 Colón-Ríos explains that the notions of the unlimited 
constitution making power and citizen involvement are expressed through the ideals of 
democratic openness, and popular participation, which he states are the basic components of 
democracy.
26
   
 Under his conception, a constitution making episode must give effect to the ideals of 
democratic openness and popular participation if it is to be considered democratic.
27
 With 
respect to popular participation this rules out “elite” or “expert” constitution making.
28
 There 
must be as much citizen involvement as possible through all stages of the process. The ideal 
of democratic openness requires that the constitution maker is subject to no external or legal 
limits whatsoever and is free to adopt any constitution it pleases.
29
 
 Colón-Ríos identifies three elements that would usually lead to a constitution making 
process that is consistent with the above-explained ideal of popular participation: the 
constituent assembly should be elected in such a way that promotes the participation of all 
sectors of society; popular participation should occur in all stages of the process; and 
constitution making should only occur in the context of strong popular support for 
constitutional change.
30
 
 Put simply, democratic openness requires that the constitution maker is subject to no 
external constraints in any way, shape, or form. There are three factors which must be 
satisfied in order for a constitution making episode to conform to the ideal of democratic 
openness: the constitution maker cannot be legally limited by any form of positive law; the 
constituent assembly must not be subject to any external limits; and the constitution making 
act should not result in the abolition of democracy.
31
 
                                                            
23 Andreas Kalyvas, above n 8, at 229. 
24
 Joel I. Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 22. 
25
 At 23. 
26
 At 23. 
27 At 23. 
28
 At 28. 
29
 At 28. 
30
 At 31. 
31 At 35. 
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 Colón-Ríos is not alone in his promotion of a constituent assembly endowed with 
unlimited constitution making power. There are many academics, and politicians, who 
advocate the use of an extraordinary constituent assembly (constituent assembly) - as opposed 
to an ordinary legislature – as the official body to draft a constitution.
32
 The promotion of the 
constituent assembly is linked to the theory of constituent power, and, more generally, is said 
to increase the democratic legitimacy of the constitution making process.
33
  
 A constituent assembly can be differentiated from an ordinary legislature because it is 
a body which is convened (usually elected) for the sole purpose of constitution making
34
 and 
it ceases to exist once the process is complete. It can be described as ‘extraordinary’ because 
it is not a normal and permanent government institution.
35
  
Jon Elster does not claim that constituent assemblies (which he refers to as 
constitutional conventions) produce better constitutions than ordinary legislatures, but rather, 
he argues that in terms of procedure they “are more likely to embody the process of free and 
unconstrained deliberation amongst all parties.”
36
 Further, when explaining his normative 
theory of constitution making Jon Elster states that, “The most important desideratum is 
probably that constitutions be written by specially convened assemblies and not by bodies that 
also serve as ordinary legislatures.”
37
One of the reasons for this is that the legislature has an 
inherent interest in its own power within the constitution, and, as such, should not be “allowed 
to be the judge of its own cause.”
38
  
Elster claims that constituent assemblies are more likely than legislatures to allow for 
reason to prevail over interest, and passion.
39
 This also gives the constitution more legitimacy 
because it is not viewed as a simple case of bargaining between interest groups.
40
 According 
to Elster, with greater legitimacy, comes greater stability.
41
 
He claims that legislatures that accord themselves the power to make a constitution 
may be criticised, because they were not elected for that task.
42
 Another manner in which he 
sees legislatures as inferior is that there are usually relatively unrepresentative, because they 
are most often elected using either a majority voting system, or a proportional voting system 
with a high threshold.
43
 Elster believes that a proportional voting system, with a low 
threshold, should be used to elect a constitution making body.
44
 A more representative body 
                                                            
32
 See Joel I. Colón-Ríos, above n 5; Jon Elster “Ways of Constitution-Making”, above n 6; Jon Elster, 
“Legislatures as Constituent Assemblies”, above n 6.  
33
 See Joel I. Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 27. 
34
 At 27; Jon Elster, “Legislatures as Constituent Assemblies” above n 6, at 182.  
35
 Joel I. Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 27.   
36 Jon Elster, “Legislatures as Constituent Assemblies” above n 6, at 185. 
37
 Jon Elster “Ways of Constitution-Making” above n 6, at 137. 
38
 At 138. 
39
 Jon Elster, “Legislatures as Constituent Assemblies” above n 6, at 185. 
40 At 185. 
41
 At 186. 
42
 At 186. 
43
 At 186-187. 
44 At 187. 
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enjoys more legitimacy and thus so too will the constitution that emerges from this body. He 
therefore sees the choice of electoral system as a key element.
45
  
Elster claims that “individual and groups interest are substantially less important in 
constitution making than in ordinary legislation.”
46
 This is because the matters that are 
addressed in a constitution are, according to Elster, less susceptible to personal interest. The 
majority needed for a presidential veto or the frequency of general elections, are examples of 
the relative unimportance of some matters typically addressed in a constitution, in terms of 
self-interest to the framers.
47
  
Another problem for Elster with a legislature is that debates will be public, whereas he 
claims that private discussions are preferable because there is more scope for rational 
discussion, rather than the “rhetorical overbidding”
48
 which is likely in public debates. 
When the legislature performs the dual role of legislation and constitution making, 
Elster sees a danger that politicians may put forward their proposals as constitutional, rather 
than legislative, in order to negate the possibility of having the measure vetoed. This risk was 
present in the Assemblee Constituante where legislative provisions were subject to a royal 
veto but constitutional provisions were not.
49
 
 As with Elster, Joel Colón-Ríos claims that the constituent assembly is an essential 
element in the constitution making process. But unlike Elster, Colón-Ríos does not add the 
qualification that it is “probably” the most important requirement in the process. Instead, he is 
more emphatic and claims that it is the most important element in terms of ensuring the 
democratic pedigree of the process.
50
 The assembly can be seen as a practical expression of 
the constituent power theory, because it is “commissioned exclusively for the exercise of 
constituent power, the unlimited constitution making power that is said to rest with the people 
in a democracy.”
51
 
 By choosing the constituent assembly as the proper constitution making body, the 
legislature and the executive are automatically rejected. He states that executive made 
constitutions are clearly inimical to popular participation, and apart from externally imposed 
constitutions, they involve the lowest level of popular participation.
52
 But, as he explains, 
there are in fact many reasons to see an ordinary legislature as an appropriate constitution 
making body. The members of the legislature are directly elected, they represent major 
societal interests, and they are directly accountable to their constituents in periodic elections. 
Even if there is limited participation in the drafting stage, a draft prepared by a legislature can 
still be subject to ratification in a referendum. The concern that a legislature lacks democratic 
pedigree because it was not elected to make a constitution could be ameliorated by calling a 
                                                            
45
 At 187. 
46
 At 191. 
47
 At 190. 
48 At 191. 
49
 At 191. 
50
 Joel I. Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 27. 
51
 At 27. 
52 At 27. 
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special election to grant them constitution making power. Both a legislature and a constituent 
assembly are comprised of representatives, neither body involves the citizenry coming 
together as one and deliberating. Although the constituent assembly replicates the legislature 
in that regard, it can be contrasted in that it can be characterised as a break from legal 
continuity within the existing order. Its claim to possess constituent power may have the 
effect of delegitimising the constituted powers like the courts and the legislature.
53
  
 However, despite all these factors, Colón-Ríos still prefers a constituent assembly over 
an ordinary legislature. He provides three reasons. The first is that the legislature’s power is 
regulated by the constitution, so the constitution maker may wish to reform it. As such, along 
with Elster, Colón-Ríos believes that the legislature should not be the master of its own cause. 
This means that the legislature is an inappropriate body in terms of achieving the ideal of 
democratic openness which requires that the fundamental form of government can be 
questioned. Moreover, if the legislature drafts the constitution then it is difficult to 
differentiate the constitution making process - as one of higher law making - from ordinary 
day to day politics. In this regard, a constituent assembly is preferable because it signals to the 
public that this is a special process which stands apart from ordinary politics and, as such, 
may encourage people to participate more than they would if an ordinary legislature was 
making the constitution. In sum, a constituent assembly is the perfect vehicle for the exercise 
of unlimited constitution making power because “it stands above and outside the ordinary 
institutions of government, including the fundamental laws.”
54
 
 The second reason builds on the first. A legislature has the mandate to make day to 
day governance decisions. Because of this, it is dominated by traditional political parties and 
interest groups. In contrast, a constituent assembly is unconcerned with day to day decisions 
and instead is focussed solely on fundamental law. For this reason, it may prompt new people 
and groups who have traditionally been marginalised or disenchanted with politics to 
participate. These people and groups may jump at the chance to participate in the 
reconfiguration of the institutions which they have lost faith in.
55
 
 The last reason involves a factor that is also held against constituent assemblies – the 
fact that they are not accountable through re-election, whereas members of a legislature are. 
However, Colón-Ríos sees this is an advantage in terms of democratic openness because the 
members of an assembly do not have to worry about re-election so they will:
 56
 
…feel free to propose and support novel measures beneficial to society at large or to put 
into question long established institutions, even against the opposition of small but 
powerful sectors of society.  
                                                            
53
 At 27-28. 
54
 At 28. 
55
 At 28-29. 
56 At 29. 
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But assuming that the referendum will be subject to ratification in a referendum then 
they still cannot ignore the views of the citizenry.
57
  
 In this section I have outlined the conceptions of constitution making which favour 
high levels of popular participation, and unlimited constitution making power within a 
constituent assembly. From Schmitt and Sieyès, through to Colón-Ríos, these conceptions are 
grounded on the theory of the constituent power. 
III Analysis of the Literature  
 I now turn to a discussion of the implications for the constituent power theory for the 
round table model, and to various critiques of the constituent power theory and its corollary of 
unlimited constitution making power. Following this, I will outline the round table model, and 
argue that this may be a preferable to unlimited constitution making power within a 
constituent assembly, on both a theoretical and practical level. 
The implementation of the round table model is incompatible with Colón-Ríos’ 
conception of democratic openness, and with the theory of constituent power as espoused by 
Sieyès et al, because it means that the constitution maker will be bound by the principles and 
rules contained in the interim constitution, rather than having unlimited constitution making 
power. However, in my view, a degree of democratic openness can be traded off for the 
practical benefits to be gained from the round table phase: the creation of certainty and the 
prevention of unilateral exercises of power by constraining the assembly with the interim 
constitution. The round table model is able to achieve this by applying constitutionalism to 
the process of constitution making. I mean this in the sense that the process of constitution 
making itself occurs within limits, just as a constitution binds the actors who are subject to it 
to act within preconceived limits. 
The evidence shows that executive made constitutions do have a tendency to self-
aggrandise the executive.
58
 However, the theory that the constituent assembly has an 
advantage in terms democratic openness is only applicable if the members of the assembly are 
not also members of the legislature, or affiliated with political parties in the legislature. In all 
the case studies contained in this paper, members of the assembly were also members of the 
legislature or were at least affiliated with major political parties. This fact also nullifies the 
perceived advantage of members of an assembly being better able to put the power of the 
legislature into question in the new constitution. In any event, there is evidence that 
parliamentary constitution makers do not typically self-aggrandise their power within a 
constitution.
59
 And, moreover, there is some evidence that constituent assemblies ascribe 
more power to the legislature than a legislature does.
60
  However, there are examples of 
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individuals within a constituent assembly, imbued with unlimited constitution making power, 
creating more power for their position within the constitution. In these cases, a constitution 
which is ostensibly made by a constituent assembly, is for all intents and purposes, in fact an 
executive made constitution.
61
 
David Landau prefers constitution making by an ordinary legislature. He claims that 
there should be more emphasis placed on avoiding worst case outcomes rather than 
idealistically aspiring for best case outcomes.
62
 In particular, the process should seek to 
restrain the unilateral exercise of power by dominant groups or individuals. In this respect, 
constituent assemblies are inappropriate constitution making bodies because they may be 
harder to restrain by the courts and parliamentarians when they are operating under the 
ideology that the constituent assembly is an untouchable original constituent power.
63
 He 
echoes the claims of William Partlett, who believes that when ‘strongmen’ cut from the ilk of 
Hugo Chávez or Boris Yeltsin are backed by this ideology, it may be easier for them to 
unilaterally control the process and create self-serving constitutions.
64
 
Landau claims that the classical theorists like Sieyès and Schmitt are not really 
concerned with the practical implications of their theories.
65
 According to Landau, they 
simply explain that there must be a relationship between the constituted powers and the 
constituent power where the latter has power over the former.
66
 Landau does not so much 
critique the theory itself, but rather, the practical ramifications of the theory which is that the 
constitution making process should be highly participatory.
67
 In his view, popular 
participation has the potential to “greatly increase the risk of destabilising outcomes and worst 
case scenarios.”
68
 In particular, participation may tend to be me more of a hindrance than a 
help within a “poorly institutionalised environment.”
69
 He cites the Bolivian constitution-
making episode of 2006-2009 as an example of constitution making with high levels of 
popular participation within a poorly institutionalised environment that hindered the ability to 
negotiate a constitution.
70
 Landau claims that in many instances the central focus of 
constitution making should be restraining unilateral exercises of power.
71
  
As well as the practical dangers involved in the expression of the constituent power 
theory, the theory itself has not been immune from criticism. Lars Vinx is not convinced by 
the constituent power theory. He deconstructs Schmitt’s constitutional theory, which Vinx 
claims is the driving force behind contemporary arguments in favour of popular 
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participation.
72
 Vinx states that a “strong conception of popular sovereignty…is incoherent 
and should not be used as the centrepiece of a democratic constitutional theory.”
73
 
The particular aspect of the constituent power theory he attacks is the notion of the 
popular sovereign as a constituent power that exists prior to law.
74
 Before proceeding to his 
argument, Vinx gives a preliminary account of what he believes to be the theory of Schmitt et 
al as follows. A written constitution is only legitimate if it was made by the people as the 
constituent power and continues to enjoy their tacit support. The people as constituent power 
existed prior to, and independent of, any law, and are totally unrestricted in choosing their 
constitution. The people may exercise their constituent power anew at any stage.
75
 
Vinx rejects this theory, because, according to him, it implies that there is no 
legitimate law. He states that: 
76
 
…the function of legitimate law is to reconcile us to the heteronomy that we inevitably 
suffer in a political community, where people who differ in their values, beliefs, and 
opinions must somehow take collective decisions that never fully satisfy all. 
 But, according to Vinx, advocates of strong popular sovereignty reject the idea of 
reconciliation of differences through legitimate law and believe that laws are only legitimate 
if they reflect an antecedent shared identity. However, Vinx claims that if we are in agreement 
about how our society should function because we share a “thick value laden identity”
77
 then 
we do not need any concept of legitimacy. And, if we do not share this identity, then strong 
popular sovereignty implies that there is no way that we can live legitimately under common 
laws.
78
 He claims that Schmitt’s theory implies that:
79
  
…a domestic constitution that is the product of a compromise amongst different 
groups – groups that each have their own political identity – and not the product of the 
exercise of strong popular sovereignty can be nothing more than a veiled form of 
subjection of one group to another. 
Because Schmitt claims that the people possess a political identity prior to all legal or 
constitutional order he must explain what makes the pre legal political existence of the people. 
He claims that the political identity is based on a concrete quality of collective identity. This 
can include ethnic, religious, social, or economic identities. Whichever element forms the 
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primary identity for the people becomes their pre legal political identity. To be valid, the 
identity must give rise to a “friend-enemy” distinction.
80
 Thus Vinx claims that Schmitt 
reduces legitimacy to identity. That is, the constitution is only valid if it was made by the 
people (sharing a common identity), and it reflects their convictions.
81
 According to Schmitt, 
if a law does not reflect your convictions then it is not legitimate,
82
 or it must have been made 
by a group of people to whom you do not belong.
83
 
Building on Vinx’s analysis, I believe that Schmitt’s conception is problematic on two 
counts. Firstly, it is unlikely that you will find a nation where every person agrees with every 
law, which means that the same law within the same nation could be legitimate to some but 
illegitimate to others. Secondly, there will be many nations where people do not share the 
same primary identity, so, again the same constitution will be legitimate to some but not to 
others, depending on their primary identity. Under Vinx’s interpretation of Schmitt’s theory, 
this would mean that if the law does not reflect the identity of the person, then they do not 
have to follow it, because it is not legitimate according to their identity, or that they are not 
really members of that political community, because they do not subscribe to that identity so 
they are in fact an ‘enemy’. 
If we accept that in a modern country the entire populace may not share the same 
primary identity, but regardless of that, they (or at least the majority of them) are willing to 
live together in a common political community, then a round table phase which involves 
representatives from the different interests and ‘identities’ in society determining the rules for 
the constitution making process is the best way to ensure that all ‘identities’ have a voice. The 
idea that you will find all the inhabitants of a country sharing the same identity – in the form 
of religion, or ethnicity for example – is inapplicable nowadays. To take New Zealand as an 
example, there will be citizens or permanent residents whose primary identity is as a ‘kiwi,’ 
but there will be others who may identify primarily along ethnic or religious lines and 
secondarily as ‘kiwis’. This type of pluralism is a fact of many contemporary societies, and is 
recognised through the concept of dual citizenship.  
IV The Round Table Model 
Now that I have outlined some practical and theoretical issues with the constituent 
power theory, I will move to a discussion of Andrew Arato’s views on the round table model. 
I would like to posit the round table model as a possible panacea for the ills of the constituent 
power theory. 
Arato is a staunch advocate of the round table model. He refers to it as “post sovereign 
constitution making,” because the “constituent power is not embodied in a single organ or 
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instance.”
84
 The primary reason he advocates this model is that it provides a “democratic 
alternative to revolutionary constitution making that all too easily steps over the threshold to 
dictatorship.”
85
 Arato explains that the model, which can be traced back to the American 
Revolution, was revisited in Spain in the 1970s, employed in Central Europe in the late 1980s, 
and was perfected in the South African episode, which is discussed later in this paper.
86
 The 
fundamental premise of the round table model is to apply constitutionalism to the process of 
constitution making. He claims that this is the preferable to the alternative option of 
“revolutionary-populist constitution making” which is what occurred in the Andean republics; 
Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador.
87
 
 Arato states that the most important element is the making of an interim constitution 
that binds the makers of the second and ‘final’ constitution.
88
 There are two instances that 
contribute to the drafting; the group that negotiate the interim constitution, and the group that 
drafts the final constitution, which is always a freely elected body. The group which drafts the 
interim constitution is unelected and is usually comprised of major political groups (including 
the current government and opposition parties). Arato states that this body should include the 
“main political actors controlling or capable of controlling means of violence.”
89
 The drafting 
body of the final constitution should not be called a ‘constituent assembly,’ because it does 
not have unlimited constitution making power.
90
 It is the interim constitution that subjects the 
process of constitution making to constitutionalism, by constraining the makers of the final 
constitution.
91
 
While the round table negotiating bodies technically have no legal status, as they are 
essentially private gatherings, the presence of the previous ruling party means that the 
provisions contained in the interim constitution are more than mere proposals which the 
ratifying body (usually parliament) can accept or reject.
92
 The limitations contained in the 
interim constitution, which the drafters of the final constitution will be subject to, can vary in 
their type and scope. They can be as minimal as providing for the ratification rules for the 
final constitution, but they can be much more detailed, and, amongst other things, can include 
rules regarding the make-up of the constitution making body, the voting rules they will be 
subject to, the role of external input, and the time frame for completion of the constitution.
93
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 The round table model provides legal continuity, as there is no legal rupture between 
the old regime and the new,
94
 because the constitution makers usually revert to the 
amendment rule under the previous constitution when making the new constitution.
95
 
However, Arato claims that the legality that is being relied upon may be ‘fictional’, as the 
amendment rule being used may not have been treated by the old regime as the actual rule of 
constitutional change. This is especially so when the previous regime was a dictatorship with 
a ‘sham constitution,’
96
 in the sense that government practise is incongruent with the written 
constitution.
97
 But this is not a major issue, because according to Arato, legal continuity with 
the old regime is not as important as legality of action when making the new constitution; that 
is, the following of the procedures for the round table model.
98
  He cites the Iraqi constitution 
making episode of 2005 as an example of violation of procedural rules, which had negative 
consequences, and was widely criticised.
99
  
 This leads to a critical element that is necessary for the round table model to function 
properly; the ability for the interim constitution to be enforced. If the interim constitution 
cannot be enforced, then it cannot perform its vital function of regulating the drafting of the 
final constitution, and the rules of the process are liable to be violated.
100
 The enforcement 
occurs through the establishment of a constitutional court to certify that the final constitution 
produced by the constitutional assembly accords with the interim constitution.
101
 Parties can 
apply to the court for declarations that certain provisions of the draft constitution are 
unconstitutional,
102
 and if the application is successful, the court can then advise the assembly 
as to how to redraft the offending provisions.
103
 
 Arato explains that there is a prima facie issue of legitimacy with the round table 
model as the makers of the interim constitution are unelected, and they are binding the elected 
makers of the final constitution.
104
 But, Arato claims that the model can be legitimate in the 
sense that the “actual political actors, taking into account their identities and interests, come to 
regard a state of affairs, or a projected one, as valid.”
105
  
 The limitations placed on the drafters of the final constitution are clearly in conflict 
with the theory of the people’s unlimited constituent power. But, Arato questions the cogency 
of the constituent power theory. He refers to the argument made by Janos Kis that “the people 
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are never a primordial entity but are always legally constituted, and therefore with specific 
powers and limitations.”
106
 Arato then refers to Maurice Hauriou’s claim that constituent 
power is divisible; it can exist in both the people and the state simultaneously. The state is 
limited by popular consent, and the people are limited by state sovereignty.
107
 
 Arato describes the theory of unlimited constituent power of the people as an 
“unacceptable political mythology, based on incoherent originalism”.
108
 He claims that 
historical analysis and logic show that the legal identity of the sovereign people, which can 
only act through representatives,  comes into existence through electoral rules and procedural 
rules that are ‘given’ to the people by elites. Without this constituting act of the elites, there 
would be no body referred to as ‘the people’ capable of political action.
109
 Under this 
conception, the limitations placed on the constituent assembly (as the representatives of the 
people) under the round table model are legitimate. He derides the “mythologizing”
110
 of the 
members of the constituent assembly as being identical to the people. The round table model 
does not equate the final constitution drafting body with the people, but, rather, accepts that 
they are representatives of the people, and as such are subject to limitations.
111
 
Under my conception of constitution making, the presence of a constituent assembly is 
not the most essential element. As explained earlier, it is a round table phase. This belief is 
undergirded by both practical and theoretical concerns. The primary practical danger inherent 
in unlimited constitution making power is that it is susceptible of being abused when it is 
effectively concentrated in one group or individual, as is borne out by the case studies which 
follow hereafter. The theoretical concerns include the inability of the theory to allow the 
plurality of identities which is present in many contemporary nations to live legitimately 
under the same constitution, and on the questionable validity of the theory that the people are 
a primordial entity whose legal identity exists prior to the establishment of electoral and 
procedural rules by elites.  
V Case Studies 
In this Part I outline the constitution making episodes in Bolivia, Venezuela, Russia, 
and South Africa. I will endeavour to portray the practical advantages of the round table 
model by reference to the South African process, and, conversely, to show the practical 
disadvantages of the processes involved in the other case studies. In particular, I claim that the 
self-ascribed unlimited constituent power of the constituent assemblies in the Venezuelan, and 
Russian cases led to the process being hijacked by dominant individuals who were able to 
unilaterally impose constitutions under the guise of ‘constituent power’. While in Bolivia, a 
messy scenario unfolded, because the rules of the constitution making process were not 
preconceived. In my view, these eventualities may have been avoided by the utilisation of the 
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round table model. I also claim that the drafting of the final constitution should not occur in 
the midst of a ‘constitutional moment’ where there is a highly mobilised and polarised public, 
because this may inhibit the work of the drafters. Another danger is that it may be easier for a 
charismatic leader to take advantage of popular support for constitutional change, and control 
the process for their benefit. I suggest that the round table model may negate these potential 
occurrences.  
A Bolivia (2006-2009) 
The constitution making process in Bolivia began after a pacted political system based 
on consensus had broken down. From the early 1980s power was held in Bolivia by 
coalitions pursuing a broad neo liberal agenda that held their alliances together through a 
system of patronage.
112
 By the mid-2000s these parties were no longer seen as legitimate due 
to widespread corruption. It was thus a perfect storm for Evo Morales, who rose to power as 
the head of Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) which promised to take Bolivia in a new 
direction, away from neo liberal policies, and to enfranchise the indigenous majority who had 
traditionally been marginalised.
113
 The MAS was not only a political party, but also the 
formalised manifestation of the social revolution that was fermenting at the time. In 2002 
Morales was kicked out of Congress for leading protests against the Government. These 
protests were part of a broader societal dissatisfaction with the Government and their neo-
liberal policies which had resulted in numerous protests from 1999 onwards, and culminated 
in the protests in February and October 2003, which led to 30 and 59 casualties respectively. 
Many Bolivians felt disenfranchised by Government policies, and were suffering under 
economic hardship and poor living conditions. Thus, there was a groundswell of support for 
constitutional change.
114
 This is an important aspect of the Bolivian case, as this was 
constitution making in the midst of a social revolution, as opposed to the South African 
episode, where the drafting of the final constitution occurred just after a period of immense 
instability and violence. 
Morales’ party faced a vehement and well organised opposition. In general the 
opposition movement consisted of a greater proportion of non-indigenous and wealthy 
Bolivians situated in and around Santa Cruz, whereas Morales’ movement included more 
indigenous and less wealthy Bolivians.
115
 
He promised to re-found Bolivia on a more socially inclusive basis, and, to this end, 
he promoted the election of a constituent assembly. This measure was broadly supported by 
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Bolivian political parties, including the opposition, who saw it as a means to gain greater 
regional autonomy.
116
 
The MAS secured a clear majority of seats in the Assembly, thus the opposition 
parties lacked negotiating power. The opposition attempted to compensate for this by placing 
external restraints on the Assembly through the courts and Congress. But it was not clear as 
to what the ground rules were for the process, and whether, and to what extent, the external 
institutions could restrain the Assembly. At this point it is appropriate to mention the South 
African process where the rules were laid out by agreement in the interim constitution, which 
meant that there was certainty about the roles of all the actors in the process. Along with the 
lack of clarity in Bolivia, there was the mass mobilisation of “deeply invested”
117
 and 
passionate groups. This combination of factors was the perfect recipe for a chaotic 
constitution making process. 
In 2004 the previous Congress had passed a constitutional amendment allowing for 
the convocation of a constituent assembly, so in 2006 when president Morales called the 
election for the Assembly he was acting within the rules of the existing constitution. The law 
to allow the election of a constituent assembly was passed in 2006 and it contained many 
restraints on the process. Firstly, the electoral rules were proportional, which meant that the 
MAS could not completely dominate the Assembly. Secondly, the Assembly was to be held 
in Sucre, a fairly neutral city which was not a stronghold of either Morales or the opposition’s 
supporters. Thirdly, the constitutional text required a two thirds majority in the Assembly, 
before it was put to the vote in a national referendum,
118
 meaning that there would need to be 
some support from the opposition and Morales could not simply impose a constitution. 
According to Landau, the rules of the process were intended to avoid the unilateral 
imposition of a constitution by one side on the other.
119
 
The electoral rules had their intended effect. The opposition won more than a third of 
the seats in the Assembly, so Morales had to compromise with them to a degree, because he 
relied on their support to pass the constitution. However, a major issue in the process was the 
instability and contestability of the external constraints on the Assembly. Prior to first the 
meeting of the Assembly, the MAS talked about the possibility of exercising “original 
constituent power.”
120
  Morales belief was that the Assembly must be above all the 
constituted powers, but only subservient to the people.
121
 However some external restraints 
held, for example, the Electoral Court suspended a vote gained by MAS to hold a referendum 
because the opposition had been prevented from entering the floor to vote.
122
 This issue may 
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not have arisen had the rules of the constitution making process been agreed upon 
beforehand, and that the Assembly would be limited by the interim constitution.  
There was also a lack of clarity as to what the two thirds majority approval of the 
constitution meant. MAS argued that it was approval of the text as a whole, whereas the 
opposition claimed that it was for each individual article. This disagreement led to a six 
month stand-off within the Assembly, including a hunger strike by some of the female 
members. This was accompanied by mass demonstrations on both sides.
123
 Eventually the 
parties compromised and agreed to use the two thirds rule for all articles of the proposed 
constitution up until July 2007.
124
 Again, we see the value of the interim constitution, which 
laid down the ground rules in the South African process. The uncertainty and delay in Bolivia 
could have been avoided if the rule regarding approval of the text had been clearly enunciated 
in the first place. 
A further issue arose when it was suggested that the capital should be moved to Sucre 
from La Paz.
125
 When the MAS passed a motion tabling the proposal, there was an 
outpouring of violence within Sucre, which prevented the Assembly from meeting for around 
four months. After negotiations failed between the Assembly members, the president of the 
Assembly convoked the Assembly in a military compound in Sucre in order to approve the 
text, but the opposition boycotted the Assembly.
126
 The Assembly was then moved to Oruro, 
a city near La Paz, and the text was approved while supporters of Morales encircled the 
building to prevent the opposition members of the Assembly from entering.
127
 
But there was still a final hurdle for MAS to get through. The law convoking the 
Assembly required that Congress call the referendum for ratification of the text, and there 
were enough members of the opposition in the Congress to prevent the referendum.
128
 This 
was met with violence and mass protests by MAS supporters, who prevented the opposition 
members from being at Congress, so the referendum was able to be enacted by the MAS who 
now enjoyed a two thirds majority in the Congress with the absence of the opposition.
129
 In 
turn this was met with popular uprisings by opposition supporters around Santa Cruz and, as 
mentioned earlier, resulted in the Electoral court suspending the calling of the referendum 
and sent it back to Congress again.
130
 The Electoral Court proved to be the opposition’s only 
real mechanism to restrain the MAS, because the Constitutional Court was inoperable, as five 
members had resigned after impeachment proceedings were bought against them by members 
of the MAS.
131
 Eventually the MAS ceased to resist the restraints placed on the Assembly 
and a constitution was negotiated with the opposition. They reached agreement in October 
2008. The referendum was called by Congress, and the Constitution passed into law with a 61 
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per-cent majority.
132
 The text included concessions to the opposition, like greater regional 
autonomy, and less state control of the economy.
133
  
 Landau believes there are several important points to take from the Bolivian example. 
The first is that the external restraints placed on the Assembly, which eventually held, 
managed to prevent the MAS from unilaterally imposing a constitution, and allowed the 
opposition to gain concessions in the final text. But although the external forces eventually 
proved effective, their role was highly contested and uncertain. At times the MAS toyed with 
the prospect of the Assembly exercising original constituent power, and thus, being above the 
constituted powers. This instability was exacerbated by very high levels of popular 
participation through mass mobilisation. Landau claims that the process highlights the 
dangers involved in constitution making within a poorly institutionalised context, where there 
is a passionate, hyper vigilant, and polarised citizenry.
134
 
According to Landau, popular participation was problematic for the Assembly.
135
 But 
Landau does not emphasise that this constitution making episode occurred during a social 
revolution. As such, it is perhaps unrealistic that it would be a completely peaceful process. 
However, it does highlight another advantage of a negotiation phase employed in the ro9unf 
table model. It may have been more helpful to negotiate an interim constitution first, and then 
when the final constitution was made, the conditions may have been more stable. But it is 
difficult to predict that this would be so, just because that is what happened in South Africa. 
Even if an interim constitution was made, there is no guarantee that the Assembly would be 
have been able to go about their work peacefully without mass demonstrations and violence. 
However, it is perhaps more desirable, if violence is inevitable, that the violence occurs in the 
interim constitution negotiation phase, rather than during the drafting of the final constitution 
in the Assembly. If violence occurs during the drafting stage it may limit the options 
available to the drafters, for fear of rousing the passions of their supporters with a proposal 
that was contrary to their wishes, or for not supporting a popular proposal. For example, most 
members of the opposition were not overly concerned with a proposal to move the capital 
city from La Paz to Sucre, but embraced the move once public protests over tabling the 
proposal became large.
136
 
 To Landau’s views I would add the following comments. The Bolivians could have 
taken a leaf out of the South African constitution making book. In particular, the negotiation 
of an interim constitution, that set clear ground rules that all the political parties agreed upon, 
could have aided in terms of creating stability and certainty in the process. It would have 
been clear before the convocation of the Assembly what the respective powers of the 
Assembly and the pre-existing institutions were. Of course, as with South Africa, this would 
not have removed the possibility of violence, but at least it would have created the possibility 
that the process of negotiating the constitution in the Assembly may have been able to occur 
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under more peaceful conditions, and the potential for violence would not have loomed so 
large in the minds of the Assembly members when making decisions. On the other hand, a 
more pessimistic view is that the violence and obstructive mass mobilisation would have still 
occurred, because there was so much at stake, as the country was in the midst of a social 
revolution.  
B Venezuela (1999)  
 The legitimacy of the two main political parties in Venezuela - who had monopolised 
political power under the Punto Fijo pact
137
 - had been damaged beyond repair by the early 
1990s due to embedded corruption coupled with a failing economy.
138
 Hugo Chávez won 
power in 1998 and promised to change Venezuela’s political system.
139
 He took advantage of 
the groundswell of support for constitutional change,
140
 and widespread popular 
dissatisfaction with the traditional elites, to neutralise the opposition forces, and assume total 
control over the constitution making process. 
 Unlike the South African process, there was no round table phase. Instead, Chávez 
was able to unilaterally determine the rules for the constitution making process.
141
 His first, 
and perhaps most important move, was to employ a majoritarian system to elect the 
Assembly.
142
 This system converted the 60 per-cent vote that his movement won into 95 per-
cent of the seats in the Assembly, albeit in coalition with other parties.
143
 This meant that his 
coalition faced no opposition from within the Assembly.
144
 The opposition forces and 
traditional elites were thus effectively excluded from participating in the writing of the new 
constitution.
145
 
 In the absence of intrinsic restraints due to diversity within the Assembly, external 
restraints appeared to be the only means through which Chávez’s power could be bridled.
146
 
However, the Venezuelan Supreme Court applied the constituent power theory and stated that 
the people’s constituent power, as manifested in the Assembly, was “prior and superior to the 
established judicial regime.”
147
 Thus, the Assembly was not limited by any positive law. The 
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Court subsequently changed tack, and stated that the Assembly was bound to the spirit of the 
existing constitution.
148
  
There were further court rulings that attempted to circumscribe the powers of the 
Assembly within existing law, but when the Assembly was convoked Chávez immediately 
declared that it was “most sovereign.”
149
 Following this, Chávez then set about dismantling 
the existing governmental institutions, as they were populated by opposition forces. To add a 
veneer of legality to his procedures, he declared a state of national emergency, which gave 
the Assembly the mandate to reorganise state powers.
150
 The Supreme Court was warned that 
its members would be replaced if they attempted to meddle with the Assembly’s work. Large 
numbers of the judiciary were replaced by judges appointed directly by the Assembly.
151
 The 
Congress, which had convened for an emergency sitting to discuss the appropriateness of the 
Assembly’s actions, had its powers sharply circumscribed, and was later dissolved by the 
Assembly. The Constituent Assembly then assumed legislative powers, along with 
constitution making powers.
152
 In this way, the Venezuelan process went much further than 
the Bolivian process, because Morales did not dissolve Congress or ascribe legislative powers 
to the Assembly.
153
 Also, state legislatures were placed under the supervision of the 
Assembly.
154
 
The drafting phase was relatively quick, taking only a few months. In Landau’s view, 
this was because most of Chávez’s energy was spent in supressing and dismantling state 
institutions. Although there was a reasonable amount of public participation - for example 
through submissions from civil society groups to the Assembly
155
 - Landau claims that it was 
merely “window dressing.”
156
 Although some of the content of the submissions were 
incorporated into the constitution, this was at the level of details, whereas the overall 
structure, and the most important points of the constitution, remained as Chávez had initially 
proposed them.
157
  
Chávez’s ability to unilaterally write electoral rules that gave him full and unbridled 
power in the Assembly highlights the dangers of the constituent power theory when it is 
effectively concentrated in one individual. The presence of a round table phase including 
representatives from most (ideally all) sectors of society, can negate this risk because it is 
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highly unlikely that this kind of body would agree to a non-proportional electoral system for 
the convocation of an assembly, as this would mean that one party could dominate the 
assembly, whereas an assembly elected using a proportional system is likely to be 
representative to a degree, and is unlikely to be completely dominated by one party. 
Furthermore, Chávez would have been constrained by the interim constitution, which may 
have prevented the self-aggrandisement that appeared in the constitution. The constitution 
which emerged from the process had elements of self-interest that may not have emerged 
from a more representative assembly which was limited by an interim constitution. For 
example, the previous constitution allowed one term for the President, whereas the new 
constitution extended this to two, as well as extending the length of each term.
158
 Overall, the 
new constitution “enabled the executive to massively expand its powers,” and to reduce the 
separation of powers.
159
 
C Russia (1993) 
Boris Yeltsin was the first elected president in post-communist Russia. By the time he 
was elected, Russia’s constitution had been amended thoroughly since the communist era, and 
a system including an elected president, and a constitutional court had been established.
160
 
The Constitutional Court upheld the separation of powers by striking down ultra vires uses of 
power by both Parliament and the President.
161
  
However, Yeltsin and his supporters were opposed to the constitutional limits on 
presidential power, so they set about undermining these limits by promoting the supremacy of 
the President and critiquing the current allocation of power within the constitution. One of 
Yeltsin’s aides described the justification for the ‘superior power’ of the President as being 
that the President’s power emanates from popular sovereignty. According to William Partlett, 
the aide effectively claimed that “the Russian Presidency’s power flowed directly from its 
embodiment of constituent power.”
162
 Yeltsin also attempted to de-legitimise the main 
institutions which bridled the President’s power - Parliament and the Constitutional Court – 
by claiming that they were relics of the communist era and did not represent the people’s 
power. 
Yeltsin was frustrated with the restraints on Presidential power in the existing 
constitution. After a messy affair of political toing and froing,
163
 he held a referendum in 
which one of the questions was “Do you have confidence in your President”? After receiving 
58 per-cent of the vote in his favour on this question, he took it as a mandate for abolishing 
the existing constitution and expanding the President’s powers. The justification for this was 
                                                            
158
 Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Article 230. 
159
 Maxwell Cameron and Kenneth Sharpe, above n 87, at 112. 
160
 William Partlett, above n 11, at 210. 
161
 At 212. 
162
 At 214. 
163 For more on the interplay between the President, and the other state powers, in the making of the Russian 
Constitution, regarding the proposed powers of the President within the Constitution, see Rett R, Ludwikowski, 
“Constitution Making in the Countries of Former Soviet Dominance: Current Development”, (1993) 23 2 GA. J. 
Int’l. & Comp. L 155, at 169-173. 
 
27 
 
that the people had exercised their constituent power by expressing their confidence in the 
President, and he was now the embodiment of their constituent power.
164
 
He then appointed, rather than elected, a constituent assembly, which was controlled 
by his closest aides. In line with the constituent power theory, he declared that the Assembly 
was an extra legal body which was above the constituted powers (i.e. Parliament and the 
Judiciary).
165
 Importantly, Yeltsin enjoyed political and economic support from the U.S. For 
example, an article in the New York Times stated that Yeltsin had “rough-and-ready 
democratic legitimacy for his decrees.”
166
 Another New York Times article in support of 
Yeltsin stated that “a popularly elected president might have more authority than a legal but 
dysfunctional assembly.”
167
 Not only was there support in U.S media, the U.S Government 
provided Yeltsin with financial support. The Senate majority leader George Mitchell stated 
that they supported him because his views were “consistent with the views of the 
overwhelming majority of the Russian people.”
168
 Indeed, Yeltsin did enjoy some popular 
support for his measures, but it was hardly overwhelming; a 1993 survey found that 50 per-
cent of Russians believed Yeltsin’s reliance on the military to “control the situation” was 
warranted.
169
 
President Yeltsin proceeded to disband the elected Parliament and the Constitutional 
Court, and drafted a constitution conferring vast powers on the President, which was duly 
ratified by the people.
170
 An example of the President’s power was that he was placed above 
the traditional tripartite separation of powers within the new constitution.
171
 If the lower house 
of Parliament (the Duma) rejected the President’s choice of Prime Minister then the 
constitution provided that the president must dissolve the Duma and appoint a Prime 
Minister.
172
 The constitution took away some of the democratic nature of the previous 
constitution because it provided that the Federation Council (the senate) would be ‘formed’ 
rather than ‘elected’.
173
 This was done so Yeltsin could stack the council in his favour. To 
complete his control over the state, the constitution gave the President unchecked power to 
appoint all the members of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court.
174
 The public 
stance that was expressed by one of his aides admitted that the constitution was un-democratic 
by referring to it as “enlightened authoritarianism.”
175
  
                                                            
164
 At 218. 
165
 At 219. 
166
 Editorial, Russia: A Democrat’s Coup, N.Y Times, Sept 22, 1993, at A26. 
167 Serge Schmemann, In Russia, Legitimacy Remains an Elusive Goal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1993, at E1. 
168
 Thomas L. Friedman, Showdown in Moscow; U.S. to Speed Money to Bolster Yeltsin, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 
1993, at A13. 
169
 Survey conducted by LABADA-TSENTR, Rossiiane o sobytiiakh 3-4 oktiabria 1993 goda [Russians on the 
events of October 3-4, 1993] (Oct. 3, 2005), <www.levada.ru/press/2005100301.html> 
170
 William Partlett, above n 11, at 225. However, many Western commentators focussed on the large amount of 
individual rights contained in the new constitution, William Partlett, above n 11, at 223-224. 
171
 William Partlett, above n 11, at 224. 
172 Constitution of the Russian Federation 1993, Article 111 (4). 
173
 William Partlett, above n 11, at 225; see also Paul Chaisty, Legislative Politics and Executive Power in 
Russia, (Palgrave MacMillian, Hampshire, 2006), at 104. 
174
 William Partlett, above n 11, at 225. 
175 Eugene Huskey, Presidential Power in Russia, (M.E Sharpe, New York, 1999), at 32.  
28 
 
According to William Partlett, Boris Yeltsin used the constituent power theory to 
create a “plebiscitary dictatorship in the garb of liberal constitutionalism.”
176
 Yeltsin appeared 
to take advantage of the constituent power theory in order to validate any action he saw fit. As 
with the Bolivian and Venezuelan examples, the round table model may have removed his 
opportunity to control the process unilaterally. For example it is unlikely that a negotiated 
interim constitution would agree to Yeltsin simply appointing a constituent assembly, and to 
disbanding the organs of government. 
D  South Africa (1996)  
The South African constitution making process that culminated in the adoption of a 
constitution in 1996 is viewed by many as a successful example of popular participation.
177
 
And, the text itself is “widely regarded as a model constitutional text.”
178
 Although South 
Africa had three previous constitutions, this was the first one that was adopted through a 
democratically constituted body representing all South Africans.
179
 As well as the abolition of 
apartheid, the 1996 constitution marked a shift from parliamentary sovereignty to 
constitutional supremacy, with a super-majority needed within parliament to change 
constitutional provisions, and a role for the judiciary in upholding the constitution.
180
  
The process occurred in the context of the democratic transition marking the end of 
apartheid.
181
 It involved two major stages. The first stage, from 1990 – 1994, involved the 
major parties negotiating an interim constitution. The major parties that were involved were 
the National Party (the apartheid government party), the African National Congress (ANC), 
and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The second stage was the election of a Constituent 
Assembly to make the constitution. The Assembly was constrained by the principles agreed 
upon in the negotiating stage and contained in the interim constitution.
182
 
There was no formal popular participation in the negotiation of the interim 
constitution.
183
 The first multi-party talks were held at the Convention for a Democratic 
South Africa in late 1991. The multi-party forum was able to agree on many fundamental 
issues, including a multi-party democracy in a united South Africa, with an entrenched and 
justiciable bill of rights. The convention appeared to be a promising start, but then it became 
clear that the National Party was seeking to control the process, and maintain their power 
through constitutional gerrymandering.
184
 The Government insisted on federalism as a pre-
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condition to the democratically elected constituent assembly, because they wanted to have 
greater regional autonomy, and maintain Bantustans. It was this condition, amongst others, 
that led to the breakdown of these negotiations.
185
 
In response to this, the ANC rallied with its supporting Labour and Communist 
movements, and began mass demonstrations, agitating for the election of a constituent 
assembly. In turn, these demonstrations were met with violence from opposition forces, 
which culminated in the Boipatong massacre - in a township that supported the ANC – where 
around 40 people were killed.
186
 The ANC then formally announced that they were 
suspending multi-party negotiations, and made various demands of the Government, 
including that they release the (approximately) 300 political prisoners they were holding in 
contravention of earlier agreements, and that they ban their supporting parties (the IFP) from 
carrying lethal weapons.
187
 
Following this, it appeared that the National Party might be willing to compromise in 
order to draw the ANC back into negotiations, as they made concessions like accepting 
international observers, and expanding peace accord structures designed to reduce conflict in 
specific communities.
188
 However, while they agreed in word to the end of apartheid, they 
would not disband the systems in place in right winged white communities and Bantustans 
that implemented apartheid.
189
 
 Some members of the ANC and the Communist party had sought inspiration from 
Eastern Europe where they had recently witnessed people’s revolutions in which socialist 
regimes had been transformed. The non-violent revolution in Germany, where the Berlin wall 
was felled as a result of mass mobilisation, was particularly inspirational.
190
  They called for 
an interim government to take over from the apartheid regime, and used mass mobilisation to 
pressure the government to this end. They proposed an Act that set up an interim government 
and the election of a constituent assembly to make a constitution. There was a lot of popular 
support for this Act, with over four million workers striking for two days in support of the 
proposed Act.
191
  
However, after this promising start, things took a turn for the worse when the ANC 
turned their attention to the Bantustans. Twenty thousand ANC members marched on the 
Ciseki Bantustan, and were fired at by security forces, with 28 ANC members killed and over 
200 injured. A massacre followed at Bishop which ended that round of negotiations.
192
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this point the ANC realised that they could not replicate the successful non-violent revolution 
in Germany.
193
 
Notwithstanding the brutal violence, negotiations resumed after a short while with the 
Record of Understanding reached between the parties. Compromise was needed to break the 
deadlock; the National Party agreed to the election of a constituent assembly and the ANC 
conceded to having an interim Government of National Unity (meaning that all parties were 
represented, including the National Party).
194
 
The negotiated interim constitution entrenched the Government of National Unity for 
five years, which gave the National Party the legal continuity they desired. But not long after 
negotiations resumed, the leader of the Communist Party (and an ANC member) Chris Hani 
was assassinated by a white man associated with right wing politics. Despite this, 
negotiations continued, and the interim constitution was finalised by the end of 1993. The 
first democratic elections were to be held the following year.  
Key features of the interim constitution were that the final constitution was to be 
made within two years of the first sitting of the Constituent Assembly. A super majority of 
two thirds of the Assembly was required to pass the constitution into law, and the 
Constitutional Court was to certify that the constitution complied with the principles laid 
down in the interim constitution. On one occasion, the Constitutional Court exercised their 
power by striking down a proposed provision to implement the death penalty, which was 
supported by the majority of South Africans,
195
 because it violated the principles contained in 
the interim constitution.
196
 The threshold was later lowered to 60 per-cent, but the 
constitution ended up passing with an 87 per-cent majority. Heinz Klug claims that the high 
threshold for the constitution’s promulgation helped to ensure a spirit of compromise.
197
 To 
this I would add that the internal diversity of the Assembly also ensured a spirit of 
compromise. 
Provision for the election of a constituent assembly was provided for in Chapter Five 
of the interim constitution. The Assembly was comprised of the two houses of Parliament; 
the National Assembly and the Senate, so is more aptly described as a ‘constituent 
legislature.’
198
 It was broadly representative, consisting of 490 members from seven political 
parties. The Assembly set up a 44 person constitutional committee to provide administrative 
support and to implement the public participation initiatives.
199
 In addition, six theme 
committees consisting of policy and legal experts were set up to collect information, views, 
opinions, ideas, and submissions on the content of the constitution.
200
 The theme committees 
held seminars on specific aspects of the constitution and invited participation from interest 
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groups, academics, and non-governmental organisations, as well as other members of the 
Assembly. There was even a technical refinement team to ensure that the text of the 
constitution was consistent and easily understood.
201
 An independent panel of seven 
constitutional experts was engaged to provide advice and to help resolve disputes in the event 
of a deadlock if the Assembly was unable to attain the required two thirds majority within the 
two year time frame.
202
  
During the drafting stage, the Assembly implemented a broad public participation and 
consultation programme. The process adhered to the three principles of accessibility, 
inclusivity, and transparency.
203
 It began with a comprehensive education campaign, 
informing the public about constitutional issues in general, fundamental rights, and their right 
to participate. Throughout the drafting stage a variety of media were used to keep the public 
informed, and allow them to participate; including bi-weekly Assembly newspapers, 
billboards, radio and television, the internet, and a telephone hotline. Citizens were actively 
encouraged to make submissions to the committee, and workshops were held all over the 
country.
204
A central element in the programme of participation was public meetings where 
members of the Assembly presented their work and the public could express their views in 
response to this. Everything that was said at the meetings was recorded and transcribed.
205
 As 
well as general meetings, specific meetings were held on topics like the bill of rights and the 
judiciary.
206
 An Assembly radio programme was broadcast in eight languages and reached 
around ten million people per week (approximately a quarter of the population).
207
 The 
overall campaign of public engagement reached approximately 73 per-cent of South 
Africans.
208
 
The Assembly received 13,443 submissions,
209
 and approximately two million people 
signed various petitions.
210
 The submissions were processed by the secretariat of the 
Assembly and edited into a more accessible format by the teams working on various aspects 
of the constitution. Special consideration was given to submissions from groups with 
specialised knowledge on certain issues.
211
 
The third stage followed publication of the draft text. Public submissions were again 
received and attached to the various articles for consideration by the Assembly in the final 
negotiation process. Some people criticised this phase as the final negotiation was done 
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behind closed doors,
212
 and it is not clear how much consideration the submissions were 
given.  
But nevertheless, the process was seen as a success by many. Phillip Dann considered 
that the comprehensive civic education process and the direct engagement with the citizens 
were crucial to the successful integration of public participation into the process. A survey 
indicated that knowledge of the constitution was fairly high, and that many people felt a sense 
of ownership of the constitution due to the highly participatory nature of the constitution 
making process.
213
 On May 8 1996, 87 per-cent of the Assembly voted in favour of the 
constitution, and it became law.
214
 
While the South African process has been widely lauded, it has also received 
criticism. Firstly, it has been said that the participation was largely limited to the middle class 
and the “urban intelligentsia”,
215
 and that the large rural population was either bypassed or 
were disinterested in the process. Others have questioned the wisdom in receiving so many 
submissions, and doubt that a constitutional draftsman could actually read and review them 
all, let alone take them all into consideration.
216
 Some have even said that the whole process 
was an “elaborate hoax,” designed to mask the fact that the final constitution would be 
negotiated behind closed doors by elites, and would not be submitted for public approval.
217
 
Indeed, many African examples are conspicuous for not putting approval of the text to a 
referendum, but for having broad programmes of participation in the drafting stage.
218
  
There is no doubt that because the international spotlight was on South Africa due to 
the international denunciation of the apartheid regime they would have wanted to be seen to 
be doing the right thing by the international community, in terms of implementing a 
comprehensive public participation programme. But this does not necessarily mean that the 
whole public participation process was a sham. Obviously there would be difficulties in 
meaningfully processing the plethora of public submissions, but this does not mean the 
process was a waste of time and energy. Even if each submission did not have a substantive 
effect on the final constitution there is still an inherent value in giving people a voice. Also, 
the educational value of the process cannot be overlooked. 
 In my view, the most important element in the South African process was the use of 
the round table model. This is a critical element that was notably absent in the previously 
discussed constitution making episodes. The main benefit to be gained from the negotiation 
phase is the setting of clear parameters for the constitution making process, and the 
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prevention of an unlimited constitution making body that is tailor-made for one group to 
impose a constitution. In the South African episode all the actors involved were aware of 
their role and their powers. In particular, there was no debate over whether or not the 
Assembly could exercise unlimited constitution making power, because this question had 
been resolved during negotiation, with the result that principles that would bind the Assembly 
were agreed upon, and the Constitutional Court was charged with upholding them. And, the 
Court exercised this power by striking down a proposed provision in the constitution to allow 
the death penalty.
219
 The alternative to the round table model is a ‘winner takes all’ approach, 
where the victor in a national election can ascribe constituent power to themselves for the 
benefit of ramming home their own agenda unimpeded. This eventuality occurred in both 
Venezuela and Russia, and almost occurred in Bolivia.  
VI Implications of the Case Studies 
In my view, the round table model, with the negotiating phase prior to the election of 
a constituent assembly, is the most desirable method for making a constitution. The main 
purpose of this body is to set the ground rules for the constitution making process - via an 
interim constitution - before the drafting of the final constitution begins. The advantage of 
this is that it gives some certainty to the process in that everyone will be aware of the rules of 
the process before it begins. If the rules are set out in initially, then the limits placed on the 
assembly will be less likely to be contested. It may also reduce the likelihood of people trying 
to skew the rules of the process in their favour, either before the process begins, or once it is 
already underway. In my view, the Bolivian, Venezuelan, and Russian processes all suffered 
due to a lack of preconceived rules. 
In Bolivia, Morales claimed that the Assembly was exercising constituent power and 
was above the constituted powers of the state, whereas the opposition claimed that there were 
external limits on the Assembly. Eventually limits were successfully placed on the Assembly 
but the whole process could have been a lot smoother if the rules were agreed beforehand. 
As explained earlier, Chávez used a non-proportional voting system to completely 
dominate the Assembly. Along with numerical dominance in the Assembly, it was not clear 
what the rules for the process were. Chávez was able to manipulate the process to his 
advantage, and cement control over the state institutions by relying on the constituent power 
theory. 
If, as I argue they should be, the rules for the process were laid out beforehand by a 
representative body, it is unlikely that Chávez could have proceeded as he did. The following 
manoeuvres would simply not be accepted by, and agreed upon, by a broadly representative 
body: 
(i) setting the rules for election of the assembly to ensure his coalition 
completely dominated the Assembly;
220
 and  
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(ii)  declaring a state of emergency once the Assembly was convened and 
using this as authorisation to reorganise state powers. This power was used to 
remove any opposition from the judiciary and to threaten to dismantle the 
Supreme Court if they attempted to interfere with the assembly’s work;
221
 and  
(iii) dissolving the Congress and replacing it with a National Legislative 
Assembly appointed by the Constituent Assembly;
222
 and  
(iv)  granting of legislative powers to the Constituent Assembly.
223
 
This also shows the danger of carrying out a constitution making episode in the midst 
of wide spread support for constitutional change. In my view, it is important that the 
momentum for constitutional change comes from ‘below,’ but when it occurs, it should 
trigger a negotiation phase to set the ground rules constitution making process. It should not 
trigger the drafting of the final constitution. When the process occurs concurrently with the 
‘constitutional moment’,  without any preconceived ground rules,  it can be too easy for a 
dominant individual or group to use the constituent power theory to their own advantage.  
There are parallels between the process in Venezuela and Russia. In Russia, as with 
Venezuela, there were no rules to govern the process and it was not clear what powers the 
Assembly or the pre-existing governmental institutions would have. Within this void, Yeltsin 
implemented policies and manoeuvres as and when he saw he fit, in order to solidify his 
power and to craft a constitution to his liking. As described in Part V, he declared himself to 
be the embodiment of people’s power by virtue of a referendum where the majority (although 
not a large majority) declared their confidence in him as President. Quite apart from the fact 
that there is no necessary correlation between the people declaring their confidence in a 
president and that president being a personification of constituent power, the procedures he 
implemented following this were decidedly lacking in democratic pedigree. This was seen 
most directly in the appointment of, rather than election of, a Constituent Assembly, but also 
in the dismantling of the democratically elected Parliament. The process bears a striking 
resemblance to the Venezuelan process. Chávez’s methods were ostensibly more democratic 
as the Assembly was elected, but because it was done so non-proportionally Chávez was also 
able to ensure that there would be no opposition to his constitution making agenda. 
There was no real mandate for either Chávez or Yeltsin to proceed as they did. In 
neither case were they following rules agreed upon by broad consensus. Nor were they 
elected by the people, whose constituent power they claimed to be exercising, with the 
mandate to dismantle, and then unilaterally re-populate state organs to ensure their complicity 
in their constitution making exercises. 
In contrast with Bolivia, Venezuela, and Russia, the process of constitution making in 
South Africa was preconceived before the actual drafting began. The Constituent Assembly 
did not have unlimited constitution making power as they were bound by the principles laid 
                                                            
221
 At 946. 
222
 At 948. 
223 At 948. 
35 
 
down in the interim constitution. The newly created Constitutional Court was the guardian of 
these principles, and used their power to strike down a proposed provision to implement the 
death penalty, even though the proposal had received substantial popular support.
224
  
Another danger with convoking the constituent assembly as the constitutional moment 
is at its peak, is that high levels of popular participation may have an inhibitory effect on the 
Assembly. It may limit the options for the drafters, in terms of the substance of the 
constitution, if there is a passionate and polarised public, as there may be less scope to 
negotiate between the elites for fear of inflaming the passions of the people by going against 
their wishes. This situation, which occurred in Bolivia, may limit the scope for meaningful 
dialogue. If there had been a round table phase, it may not have eliminated the violence, but it 
may not have had as disruptive an influence on the constitution making process if the 
violence occurred during the interim constitution making phase. In particular, the Assembly 
may have had more room to negotiate the text in a less anxious and charged atmosphere, and 
possibly could have had more scope to compromise. Instead, the threat of violence loomed 
large throughout. 
Although there was a lot of violence during the round table phase in South Africa, this 
had largely been quelled by the time the Assembly was elected. This meant that during the 
crucial drafting stage, the Assembly was not working against the backdrop of a highly 
passionate and vigilant public, formed into opposing groups with an ‘us and against them’ 
mentality. As a result, they may have had more options available to them in terms of the 
substance of the constitutional text. 
As discussed earlier, under my conception of constitution making, popular 
participation is of secondary importance to the negotiation phase in the round table model, as 
it is this phase which will determine the method for convening the formalised constitution 
making body, which, in the end, may have a greater influence on the text of the constitution 
than the public will. Although the South African process is widely praised as a highly 
participatory process it is unclear how much influence popular participation had on the text of 
the constitution.
225
 The sheer volume of public submissions meant that it was impossible to 
incorporate all the ideas into the constitution. However, this will always be the case in any 
modern constitution making episode. In this respect, the round table model outlined earlier 
may be a more important aspect in the process than high levels of popular participation, as 
the interim constitution making phase is likely to lead to a representative constitution making 
body and may prevent one group dominating the process. Popular participation can 
accomplish neither of these objectives. And, moreover, irrespective of whether or not there 
are high levels of popular participation, it will usually be elites who are the formal 
constitution makers, at least in terms of drafting the constitution. Bearing this in mind, it is 
most important that there is a representative group of elites who form the constitution making 
body as they are the group who will have the most influence on the actual substance of the 
constitution. There are many historical examples of stable, democratic constitutions made 
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without any real popular participation. These include the Canadian,
226
 US,
227
 German,
228
 and 
Japanese constitutions.
229
 
 This is not to say that popular participation serves no purpose. In particular, 
participation in the form of public submissions to the constitution making body, 
constitutional workshops, and the comprehensive education programme, as it occurred in 
South Africa may be beneficial. Firstly, it lends democratic legitimacy to the constitution, 
because it gives some effect to the notion of government by the people, which is at the core 
of democracy. Secondly, it empowers people by giving them a voice. Even though the power 
of the public to influence the text may be limited,
230
 and each voice will not have an effect on 
the content of the constitution, there is still some intangible benefit in simply giving people 
the opportunity to express themselves. Thirdly, and this point is connected to the last point, a 
highly participatory process may give people a sense of ownership of the constitution.
231
 And 
lastly, it may increase people’s knowledge of the constitution and their rights.
232
  
In my view, popular participation was not the major issue in the Bolivian and 
Venezuelan episodes that Landau addressed; it was the absence of a round table phase. In the 
Bolivian case, this would have removed the confusion over the ratification of the constitution, 
and clarified that the Constituent Assembly would not exercise constituent power. The 
violence that occurred may have been unavoidable, but it may have been less disruptive to the 
constitution making process if it occurred during the round table phase, rather than the 
drafting stage. In Venezuela, the round table phase could have restrained Chávez’s unilateral 
exercise of power, by the implementation of a proportional voting system. 
VII Conclusion 
In this paper I presented the round table model as a form of constitution making that 
addresses both the theoretical and practical issues with the constituent power theory. With 
reference to the Bolivian, Venezuelan, Russian, and South African episodes, I attempted to 
show that the primary danger of the practical manifestation of the constituent power theory in 
a constituent assembly - the unilateral imposition of a constitution by a dominant group or 
individual – may be prevented by the implementation of the round table model. With 
reference to the Bolivian experience, I argued that another benefit of the round table model is 
providing clarity for the powers and roles of all the actors within the process. Further, I 
argued that there are risks involved in convening an assembly in the midst of a ‘constitutional 
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moment,’ and in this respect, the round table model is preferable, as the drafting of the final 
constitution will be preceded by the interim constitution making phase. Finally, while 
promoting the importance of popular participation, I placed paramount importance on the 
need for the round table model, because, in my view, the elites will have more influence on 
the constitutional text than the people. Thus, I place more emphasis on the regulation of the 
elites within the process than I do on ensuring a highly participatory process. 
Before addressing the round table model, it was necessary to outline the dominant 
theory of constitution making; that the people’s constituent power must be embodied in a 
constituent assembly that is imbued with unlimited constitution making power, and that the 
process must be highly participatory, to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the constitution 
through its authorship by the people. Following this, I reviewed some of the critiques of the 
constituent power theory, and attempted to show that the theory itself is not impenetrable, as 
the assumptions upon which the theory rests are questionable. Building on Vinx’s work, I 
argued that the idea that the people who comprise a nation must share a common primary 
identity in order for the constitution to be legitimate is inapplicable in a modern nation. I then 
outlined the argument that the primordial nature of the people, as a collective political body, 
existing prior to and independent of a constitution, is illogical and contrary to historical fact, 
as it is usually a group of elites who create a constitution which is then given to the people.  
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